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Abstract: Balancing citizens’ freedom thought, conscience and religion with the 
authority of the law which applies to all citizens alike presents an especial chal-
lenge for the governments of European nations with socially diverse and pluralistic 
populations. I address this problem from within the republican tradition represented 
by Machiavelli, Harrington and Madison. Republicans have historically focused 
on public debate as the means to identify a set of shared interests which the law 
should uphold in the interests of all. Within pluralistic societies, however, a greater 
attention must be paid to the background social conditions that may disrupt the 
deliberative process and lead to factionalism and instability. This includes certain 
changes in perspectives by both religious and secular citizens.
Keywords:﻿freedom, conscience, religion, republicanism, diversity, pluralism
Introduction:﻿“an﻿empire﻿of﻿laws”
It was when the Tarquin dynasty was overthrown, according to Livy, that Rome 
became a free nation. No longer would the Romans be subject “to the caprice of 
individual men” – which was the mark of slavery – but instead they would be 
governed by “the overriding authority of law” (1960: 105). In order to preserve 
their freedom under the law, Livy pointed to two essential features of govern-
ment: the law must treat everyone equally and act in the interests of all. What 
this meant was that, first, the law was to apply to all citizens alike and admit “no 
relaxation or indulgence” towards those who might wish to circumvent its provi-
sions by using influence or privilege or claiming special circumstances (1960: 
108). The strict application of the law’s terms, however, was not sufficient. Where 
the burdens of complying with the law’s provisions fell disproportionately on 
some citizens rather than others, the situation was regarded as oppressive. Where 
such inequalities were proven, the law was subsequently changed.1 In short, no 
one was to be above the law and neither was anyone to fall below the protection 
of the law.2
1 See Livy’s account of the Revolt of the Debtors (Livy 1960: 129–131). Oppression by unjust 
laws imposed by one’s fellow citizens was regarded as no less an evil than the threat of slavery by 
foreign enemies.
2 See Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, 1970: 183, 231–2.
Politics﻿in﻿Central﻿Europe﻿4﻿(December﻿2008)﻿2
27
Since this time, republicans have regarded the character of their laws and their 
supreme authority in regulating the relationships between citizens as definitive of 
their distinctive political position.3 In Harrington’s words, a republic is to be an 
“empire of laws and not of men” (1992: 21). Notwithstanding this proviso, however, 
the fact remains that laws are inevitably drawn up by men. This presents the citizens 
of a republic with the problem of settling upon an appropriate set of laws that meet 
the dual requirements of treating everyone equally whilst serving all their interests. 
In part, this challenge is one of determining what the relevant interests are that ought 
to be served by the law. The interests of the population, Harrington observes, are di-
verse and diverse interests are apt to give rise to diverse ideas about the way in which 
people want to be governed. Differences of opinion and interest between the citizens 
will arise even amongst relatively homogenous societies, since what is in the private 
interests of individuals will not necessarily reflect what is in the shared interests of 
the citizens. Republicans have long argued that the shared, or common, interests of 
the people ought to be arrived at through public discussion usually through a delib-
erative process of some sort which, in the modern context, typically refers to debate 
in the public sphere and a parliamentary democracy. Deliberation is, of course, no 
guarantee of consensus or agreement: as Harrington observes “reason is nothing but 
interest” and so as outlooks, opinions and interests within the population diverge, so 
the difficulties involved in reaching an agreement are magnified.
One particular area in which the citizens of a number of European countries are 
currently engaged in determining the extent of their shared interests concerns the 
exercise of an individual’s freedom of “thought, conscience and religion”. In the 
pluralistic and socially diverse context which characterises many European popula-
tions, the challenge is to ensure that the expression of citizens’ religious and ethical 
beliefs are consistent with the authority of a legal system which meets Livy’s re-
quirements of equality and inclusivity. In the language of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, we might characterise this issue as balancing the “freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs” with the limitations by law “necessary in a dem-
ocratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Article 
9). Since the law must represent the common interests of the citizens and treat them 
equally, the ideal situation is for the law to take one general form which applies to 
everyone alike. However, where this is not possible compromises may have to be 
made. Where matters of conscience and religion are concerned, the stakes can be 
high and citizens may feel that where a ruling does not adequately accommodate 
their beliefs, they are faced with a choice between complying with the law and 
remaining in good standing with their conscience or with their church.
3 See also Pettit 1997: 174–6; Skinner 1998; Laborde – Maynor 2008: 1–12.
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It has never been entirely straightforward for legislators to strike the balance 
between governing in the interests of all and protecting the interests of a few. How-
ever, the pluralism of modern European states has added to the difficulties involved. 
A number of trends within contemporary European states have contributed to this 
pluralist context. The enlargement of European Union, for example, has brought 
together citizens from a diversity of nations, ethnicities and religious traditions. 
Migrants from non-European backgrounds have, in addition, brought new cultural 
perspectives, beliefs and values which are not always reflected in the existing legal 
or institutional structures of the nations in which they live. Thirdly, the demands 
of secular legislation have, at times, also come to be seen as being at odds with 
historical religious privileges and the expectations of those who hold certain re-
ligious beliefs. This diversity has brought to light a number of disputes about the 
limits within which one can manifest one’s religion with the result that traditional 
solutions have come under pressure and must now, perhaps, be rethought. To take 
a perennial example, one might think of the affaire du foulard in France where the 
state’s commitment to laïcité, or secularism – a doctrine that was shaped in the 
wake of the disestablishment of the Catholic Church in 1905 – has since the late 
1980s been challenged by Muslim students.4 Whereas the students regard the wear-
ing of headscarves in state-run schools to be an essential feature of their freedom of 
conscience and religion, the official line has been that this practice is incompatible 
with the secular nature of the state’s public sphere.
A second illustration, concerns the controversy that surrounded the Sexual Ori-
entation Provisions of the Equality Act that came into force in the United Kingdom 
in 2007, making it illegal for providers of goods and services to treat members of 
the public differently based on their sexual orientation. Although this legislation 
is aimed at commercial and government providers, included within its scope are 
the undertakings of registered charities. Religious activities themselves are not 
directly affected (church membership or the appointment of ministers can still be 
restricted because of sexual orientation). However, where religious organisations 
are involved in charitable work they must comply with the provisions. Specifically 
mentioned as falling within the act’s scope are the operation of adoption and fos-
tering agencies. This has caused church-affiliated agencies to object that their em-
ployees would be required in the course of their work to go against their religious 
and ethical convictions. Placing children for adoption with gay couples, it was 
argued, was incompatible with the workers’ beliefs about the nature of the family 
as an essentially heterosexual institution. Without a special exemption from the 
act, the agencies protested, they would be forced to close. No exemption, however, 
was granted.
4 For the history of this debate from a republican perspective, see Laborde 2005.
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Differences of belief or interests between citizens do not concern republicans so 
long as they can be accommodated within a legal system which meets the conditions 
outlined above. Where differences cannot easily be reconciled, however, republicans 
fear that not only may the interests of individual citizens be harmed but that there is 
a risk that factions and divisions may develop with the potential to undermine the 
stability of the republic itself. The strength of feeling on certain religious or ethical 
issues, it is sometimes feared, may lead citizens to demand legal exemptions, special 
treatment or even the establishment of parallel legal systems. There would then be a 
danger that the authority of the law – which Livy pointed to as the essence of a free 
state – may become weakened to the point that the allegiance of the citizens shifted 
to alternative sources of power (such as one’s church, for example).
Rather than regarding controversies of the kind described above as clashes between 
a kind of freedom (of conscience) and the limitation to be placed on this freedom by 
laws which uphold this and other freedoms for all – as the wording of Article 9 sug-
gests – republicans understand the issue at stake to be one of ‘domination.’ I explain 
this term in detail below, but the basic idea is that where a citizen is dominated, 
either by the government or by other citizens, he or she has a claim to be protected by 
the law. In Section II, I set out the formal criteria by which cases of domination are 
to be assessed. Where citizens believe themselves to be dominated, it will be against 
these criteria that their case for protection and redress will be determined. Any test 
for domination, however, I will argue, is inevitably applied within a social and po-
litical context. This being so, when the formal considerations by which matters of 
domination are assessed are applied in concrete situations, they run the risk of being 
influenced or obscured by tacit forms of bias within the minds of the arbitrators.
Non-Domination﻿and﻿Public﻿Reason
Republicans regard the central mandate of the government to be to promote 
what is called ‘non-domination’ (Pettit 1997).5 The notion of domination governs 
the relationships both between the state and the citizens and amongst the citizens 
themselves, placing restrictions on what others (including the state) can do any 
individual whilst at the same time entitling each person to a voice in the political 
processes by which the terms of those restrictions are set. Where either condition 
has not been met then a person is said to be dominated, a state which is incompat-
ible with the status of being a citizen.6 It is as individuals that citizens have the right 
not to be dominated. However, what constitutes domination within a given society 
is something which is decided collectively through public discussion in which both 
individuals and bodies representing group interests may participate.
5 Priestley uses the term ‘oppression’ rather than domination (1993: 13).
6 Pettit 1997: 51–58.
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The restrictions on what can be done to an individual are usually expressed as a 
maxim taking the following form: nobody may interfere in the interests of another 
citizen without being forced to respect that person’s relevant interests. This condi-
tion is designed to hold together two principles. First, every citizen is said to know 
his or her own interests best. No one should be able to interfere in another person’s 
life without having to respect the ideas and opinions – or as it is often put, to “track 
the interests” – of the person suffering that interference. This idea is familiar as 
the ‘harm principle’ of standard liberal theory (Mill 1974). However, republicans 
are not required to track all a person’s interests, but only what are deemed their 
“relevant” interests. If all the personal interests of every citizen had to be taken into 
account, there would inevitably be clashes between conflicting sets of interests. 
In light of this, it is not just any interests we may happen to have that others must 
track, but only those interests we share with all other citizens as members of the 
same political community. These are our ‘avowable’ rather than our private interests 
and represent the common good. Individuals are not dominated, republicans argue, 
when others are forced to track those of their interests that form part of the common 
good. If citizens are to have any exemption or special treatment under the law, what 
they must demonstrate is that the interest of theirs that has been compromised is an 
interest which is (or ought to be) one which the citizens share.
The common good does not refer to a substantive ideal such as a set of religious 
beliefs or a national outlook – there is, in any case, little chance of this sort of 
comprehensive perspective being shared in a pluralist Europe. Rather, it is said to 
follow from the one fundamental interest we are all said to share in being free from 
arbitrary external interference (Priestley 1993: 12). The freedom to practice one’s 
religion unimpeded is considered a part of this presumptive aim as much as any 
other form of civic freedom: “civil liberty is… on the same footing with religious 
liberty. Just as no people can lawfully surrender their rights to govern themselves or 
dispose of their property as they see fit, so no one can be expected to give up their 
freedom to decide for themselves what mode of religion to practice” (Price 1992: 
33). However, republicans do not enshrine these freedoms as ‘inalienable rights’ 
which have to be balanced against the inalienable rights of others. Instead, social 
freedom is held to be realisable only within an appropriate institutional structure in 
which each individual citizen is treated as an equal and given a voice, and where 
any curtailment of a person’s freedom is only ever justified for a strictly limited set 
of reasons over which all citizens have a say in defining.7 When republicans claim 
that the citizens should deliberate about where to draw the line between individual 
7 Price and Priestley do refer to ‘natural’ or ‘unalienable’ rights. This language echoes Lockean 
natural rights language, but serves much more loosely simply as an expression of the importance 
attached to republican freedom rather than to a set of personal rights. See Pettit 1997: 101. 
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freedoms (thought, conscience or religion) and the limitations necessary to main-
tain stability, then, it is this notion that they have in mind: determining the extent of 
our ‘relevant’ interests which everyone else must track.
The concepts involved in the republican ideal of citizenship are illustrated through 
the language and imagery of the Roman ideal. To be a slave on the Roman model 
was to be within the power of someone else – a master, or a dominus (hence the 
idea of being ‘dominated’). The master, or dominating power, had the power to 
interfere in the life of the slave at will and according to his or her own discretion, 
or arbitrium (hence ‘arbitrary’ interference). Citizens had no master and, therefore, 
nobody had arbitrary power over them. This is not to say that citizens could do 
anything they liked or that nobody could interfere in their affairs at all, only that this 
interference could not be arbitrary – at anyone’s will and discretion. The coercive 
and interfering power of the law, however, was not considered arbitrary so long as 
it conformed to the conditions stated above, namely that it answered to the interests 
that each of the citizens share and that every citizen was given a voice in coming to 
settle upon what these interests were.
Citizens come to identify their common interests through the institutions and 
forums of civil society and democratic processes of government. The purpose of 
these processes is to frame laws that will enable individuals to live independently, 
as citizens sui iuris and possessing a significant degree of personal freedom consist-
ently with the fact of their living together within a republic. Traditionally, the ideal 
of non-domination, rather than reflecting the ideas and interests of the powerful 
or the majority, has been taken to imply a strong protection of the vulnerable and 
marginalised sections of society.8 As a contemporary illustration we can point to 
some of the policies adopted by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) under José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero since coming to power in 2004. Operating explicitly within a 
republican framework, the Spanish government has introduced legislation to protect 
women from domestic violence, to equalise gender opportunity in the workplace, to 
recognise same-sex marriages and to grant legal status to 700,000 illegal migrants.9 
These measures were designed to answer to the shared interest that all citizens have 
in avoiding domination and protecting their freedom and independence, although 
the specific measures themselves were sometimes highly controversial and rejected 
by significant proportions of the population.
Republicans are able to advocate controversial policies whilst maintaining their 
stance that the law must act in the shared interests of all the citizens by appealing to 
the fundamental interest each person has in not being dominated. In Price’s terms, 
listed above, this means that we have an interest in preserving our ability to decide 
8 See both Price 1992 and Priestley 1993.
9 Pettit 2008; Coffee 2009. 
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how to pursue our goals, dispose of our property and exercise our consciences free 
from the threat of arbitrary control by others. In order to ensure that the law itself 
tracks this most general shared interest, republicans typically require that in public 
discussion about what the content of the laws should be, citizens restrict themselves 
to employing only language, values and ideas that are accessible to all members 
of the community and which no one would have a good reason to reject. Coercive 
and intrusive laws, on this approach, are justified not by the fact of everybody’s 
agreement, but by the lack of anyone’s reasonable rejection. Philip Pettit – the most 
prominent contemporary defender of republicanism – argues that something will 
“represent a common interest of a population just so far as co-operatively admissible 
considerations support its provision” (2001: 156). Co-operatively admissible consid-
erations, he adds are those which “anyone in discourse with others about what they 
should jointly or collectively provide can adduce without embarrassment as relevant 
matters to take into account.”10 By placing this restriction on the manner in which 
debate is conducted, it is argued, individuals are prevented from advocating their 
private or sectarian interests ahead of those they share in common with others. In this 
way, blatant self-interest in debate is ruled out – we cannot claim that everyone else 
ought to pay tax, for example, except for us. Also ruled out, on Pettit’s formulation, 
however, are direct appeals to the particular moral or religious commitments which 
some people have, but which others in the community cannot be expected to endorse. 
Public considerations do not define the content of our common interests, but only 
control the manner in which we identify what those interests are. Once we implement 
a set of procedures which ensure that these conventions and considerations are used 
and upheld, then, says Pettit, everything else is “up for grabs” (1997: 201).
If we apply these conditions to the requirements of the Equality Act, a general 
case can be made that to suffer discrimination in the form of being refused goods 
or services, or to be offered these on terms different from other members of the 
population, on the grounds of sexual orientation is to be dominated. For a supplier 
of goods or services to treat someone this way, is to exercise a form of arbitrary 
control – since this treatment is not forced to track their interests, or, since the idea 
of sexual orientation is general, to track the common interests of the population. 
In other words, all citizens, and not just homosexual ones, have an interest in not 
being subjected to discrimination of this sort. There is no intention by the act to 
compromise religious freedom and so faith-based activities are excluded from the 
act’s scope. However, when religious organisations operate as charities (for which 
there is state support), they are deemed to be breaching the shared interest of not 
10 Pettit attributes this formulation to Habermas. As I read him, however, Pettit’s restrictions on 
what is eligible for public deliberation are much narrower than those that Habermas allows. See 
Habermas 2006. 
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being discriminated against because of one’s sexual orientation and so are bound 
by the provisions.
For a counterclaim by the agency workers to be successful, on this account, they 
would need to show that they were also dominated to the extent that the state had 
arbitrarily interfered with their freedom to manifest their religion and that their in-
terests freely to exercise their freedom of thought, conscience and religion had not 
been tracked. They would also have to show, using language and arguments which 
were accessible to all, that this was an interest they shared with other citizens, even 
non-religious ones. In the case of the agency-workers, for example, references to 
the idea of marriage as a Christian institution or their conviction that their work 
was a response to their Biblical faith would be inadmissible. Muslim students at-
tempting to make their cases about the importance to them of wearing the hijab 
would face the same difficulty. As we have outlined the concept of what constitutes 
a collectively admissible consideration, then, this may often be a very demanding 
standard to meet for religious or ethically motivated claimants.
I will not attempt to determine what the right outcome should be in these cases. 
Rather, in the next section I will consider whether such an idealised form of delib-
erative process based upon only “co-operatively admissible considerations” can, 
in fact, uncover all and only instances of the shared and collective interests of the 
population and, so, whether it could ever serve as an effective test for domination. I 
will conclude that on it’s own it cannot, and that to force people to deliberate solely 
according to these conditions is itself a dominating act which unfairly burdens some 
parties to the discussion. If they are to apply their restrictions to the content of pub-
lic deliberation without prejudice or domination, I will argue, republicans must at 
the same time pay close attention to the social context in which the discourse takes 
place, and to the dispositions displayed by the participants on all sides.
Social﻿Domination﻿and﻿the﻿Status﻿Quo
Although we have said that equality before the law is a founding principle of 
republicanism, we should note that this requirement protects only those individuals 
who have been recognised, or included, as citizens. Historically, the proportion of 
the population who qualified as citizens was often comparatively small. In Roman 
times, of course, slaves were by definition excluded. However, even a writer as 
influential as Kant was content to restrict the franchise of citizenship to include 
only adult propertied males (1991: 78). Nowadays republicans allow no such ex-
clusions, adopting instead a “principle of inclusivity” which sets the boundaries 
of qualification for citizenship as widely as possible and which, ideally, should 
include all those who live under the authority of a given law or its institutions (Pettit 
1996: 286). Driving this commitment to inclusiveness is a more general normative 
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principle, often regarded as indispensible for any plausible modern political theory 
– the equal moral worth of all individuals.11 Pettit puts it this way: “any plausible 
political ideal must be a political ideal for all.”12 By this, republicans mean that (1) 
all social groups are to be included fully as citizens; and (2) that the members of 
each group are given an equal or fair value for their citizenship.
However, as things stand, not all social groups do get a fair value for their citizen-
ship. Some sections of society are underrepresented legally and politically or have 
on average lower incomes and poorer access to social resources than the rest of the 
population. Any group of citizens suffering these kinds of social disadvantages, of 
course, would have a good case to claim that they are being dominated and so to 
seek the protection of the law and, perhaps, some redress or compensation. The 
members of these social groups, however, may regard themselves as dominated in 
a less clear-cut manner than over their access to economic or political resources. 
They may believe that their beliefs and moral convictions are not understood or 
accepted the mainstream of society and that the state’s principle institutions are un-
willing or unable to accommodate them on the same basis as individuals belonging 
to other social groups. Muslim girls, for example, even where they support a princi-
ple of separation between church and state, may feel that the burden they suffer by 
abandoning the hijab is more onerous than school officials or public administrators 
realise, and that there is no equivalent role in other religions to that played by their 
headscarf. For this reason they may believe that they have been picked out under 
legislation that does not track their interests, or indeed, represent the common in-
terests of the group and that they are, for this reason, dominated. Where citizens are 
genuinely dominated they have grounds to claim protection under the law including 
being exempted from certain of its conditions. The difficulty is, however, that where 
citizens are misunderstood, or even stigmatised or viewed in a stereotyped manner, 
then their ability to influence public debate or to make their case about domination 
in arbitration tribunals will be severely hindered.
The requirement that parties are required to make their cases using only con-
siderations which no one could reject is intended to remove this difficulty, by en-
suring both that parties only bring matters of acknowledged public interest to the 
forum, and that their case is heard according to the same impartial standard. Actual 
discussion, however, inevitably take place in a particular cultural context of ideas 
and concepts within which common practices and a widely shared sense of social 
legitimacy are made possible. Given the presence of this social context, it seems 
highly possible that cultural factors, in the form of subtle historical perspectives, 
shared conceptual schemes and complex sets of interrelated norms, will shape and 
11 See, for example, Raz 1986: 194, Dworkin 1977: 180, Kymlicka 1989.
12 Pettit 1997: 96.
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constrain the manner in which the deliberative and contestatory processes which 
are said to protect citizens from being dominated will in fact operate. The effect of 
these cultural background commitments, I will argue, can be remarkably difficult 
to identify by those who are under their influence. As a precondition to debate, 
then, the requirement that all parties stick the ideal of public discourse proposed 
by republicans such as Pettit is more onerous and more complicated to enforce and 
apply than is often supposed.
It is often easier to illustrate this point using examples from a different historical 
context, since we are no longer influenced by the particularities of that debate. Here 
we can use Kant’s restriction of citizenship to men as a paradigm example. For the 
most part, Kant is meticulous in his articulation of moral and political freedom in 
strictly universal terms. Freedom is seen as “the only original right belonging to 
every man by virtue of his humanity” and based on “innate equality” and “a human 
being’s quality of being his own master” (1996: 30). Despite this reasoning, how-
ever, Kant nevertheless somewhat casually restricts this freedom – freedom being 
dependent on citizenship, he says – in this way: “the only qualification required by 
a citizen (apart, of course, from being an adult male) is that he must be his own 
master… and must have some property” (1991: 78, my italics). Of course, Kant 
was only exposing his tacit acceptance of at least part of the socio-cultural and legal 
background of his time. However, whilst it was unimaginable for Kant that women 
could be independent citizens, so it is equally unimaginable for us that they should 
not be. The lesson we can draw from this, is that it may be no less hard for us to 
break out of our own background conceptual assumptions. If this is so, then the 
danger is that when our own marginalised, stigmatised or alienated groups attempt 
to speak out on other issues which matter to them, we may hear them with the same 
sort of prejudice that Kant displayed.
When minorities contest laws and practices in such a way as to go against the 
background values and received opinions of the dominant group, there is a possibil-
ity that decisions will not be settled not according to ‘the best reasons’ objectively 
conceived, but by the (arbitrary) strength of prevailing public opinion. Whilst pro-
fessing to be impartial, the contestatory process takes place against a baseline of 
accepted norms and de facto institutional practices similar to what Cass Sunstein 
calls “status quo neutrality”, or the taking of current ways of life as the neutral order 
of things (1993: 3–7).13 Rather than the criteria of public reason acting as a neutral 
13 Cecile Laborde also uses the idea of status quo neutrality in a republican context of multicultural 
debate. Laborde, however, refers to the unreflective acceptance of “some background institution or 
distributive pattern for granted and, as a result [failing] to provide an impartial baseline from which” 
to discuss current issues of domination etc. (2008: 13). I am referring here, however, to the unreflec-
tive acceptance of normative or conceptual ideals as representing a ‘neutral’ order of things and so 
failing to provide a baseline about what counts as a ‘co-operatively admissible consideration’. 
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and non-sectarian standard by which disputed cases of domination can be adjudged 
against the common interest, the danger is that republicans will simply be applying 
the standards of the ruling elite or the dominant social group. For example, where 
Catholics and secular French officials have made their peace with the 1905 dis-
establishment of the Church and the resulting requirements of laïcité, and take this 
settlement to be the baseline for discussions about the role of religion in the public 
and private spheres, Muslims may well wonder if and how they have been included 
in this arrangement. Similarly, where English Christians believe that not only is 
the secular elite hostile to their point of view but that on the pretext of using only 
neutral language they are also required to present their own arguments in the very 
secular terms to which they are opposed, they may also come to see themselves as 
disenfranchised and dominated.
The danger of minorities being unable to express their own alienation in terms 
that can be understood or accepted by the dominant powers is real. However, we 
should remember that in cases such as the Equality Act, the legislation had been 
designed with the intention to protect another vulnerable, historically marginalised 
and underrepresented group, namely those discriminated against on the grounds 
of their sexual orientation. In drawing attention to the dangers faced by one set of 
dominated citizens through the imposition of a certain set of deliberative standards, 
we must be wary of falling into an opposite (but surely equal) danger of appearing 
to legitimate the oppression of others by those very citizens that may subsequently 
result. There can, therefore, be no question of republicans adopting the sort of ‘dif-
ference-politics’ or ‘soft-multiculturalism’ that has often been criticised for protect-
ing group practices as part of a policy of recognising religious or cultural identities 
even where these practices have the potential to dominate their own group members 
or other sections of the community.14 Some cultural groups, for example, may fail 
to educate women within their families above a certain age, or may not allow them 
to learn the host nation’s language if it is not their first language, on the rationale 
that within their culture women have no need for an education or language skills. 
Since it cannot be an avowable common interest shared within the community for 
individuals to be denied an education which serves as the foundation of one’s inde-
pendence, then regardless of cultural practices, this seems to be an obvious case of 
domination against which republicans must legislate.
We have ruled out, then, both an appeal to the theoretical ideal of a set of collec-
tively admissible considerations and the relativistic acceptance of different cultural 
or religious standards. The question then remains whether citizens can indeed break 
the deadlock in disputes over matters of conscience where both sides appear to have 
14 See, for example, critique of multiculturalist approaches that appear to overlook this danger in 
Galeotti 2004, chapter 7. 
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a legitimate claim to seek protection from becoming dominated in a manner which 
does not itself invite further domination.
Conclusion:﻿“refining﻿and﻿expanding﻿the﻿public﻿outlook”
Where citizens reach a state of deadlock over matters of conscience or belief 
there is a risk of this leading to the formation of mutually hostile sectarian groups, 
or factions, which threaten the stability of the political community by fostering and 
nurturing loyalties other than to the institutions of the state. Under these conditions 
republican worry that individuals may trade their freedom as citizens under the law 
for the patronage of sectarian leaders who promote only a narrow range of group-
specific interests in exchange for the support of a section of the community. Such 
allegiance is said to weaken not only the cohesion of the state but also the authority 
of the law.15
Because of the intensity with which they are held, matters of religion and con-
science are often said to have an obvious potential to give rise to factions. The 
dangers of mismanaging the differences between citizens on matters of conscience 
– whether by doing nothing to contain these divisions or by further entrenching 
them through heavy-handed action – then, are great. However, as James Madison, 
in his analysis of the problem of factionalism, notes these are by no means the only, 
or even the most significant, cause of social division (Hamilton et al., 1987: 124).16 
The risk of factions developing between groups committed to pursuing divergent 
interests, he argues, is an inevitable consequence of our social freedom, including 
the exercise of personal conscience and economic activity. Since the most funda-
mental duty of the state is to uphold the freedom of the citizens, he reasons, the 
causes of factions can never be eliminated. In other words, Madison believes that 
there is no prospect of a socially or religiously homogenous community persisting 
in freedom which will not face the challenges posed by factional division. Since 
the causes of factionalism cannot be eradicated, he suggests that republicans must 
instead focus on moderating its effects. His diagnosis, I believe, shows what would 
be required for republicans to address the tensions brought about by religious and 
ethical differences in our own time.
Madison believes that the law itself can have only a limited role in controlling the 
effects of social factions for the same reason that Harrington noted, namely that the 
laws are made by people, and whoever they may be, people are susceptible to the 
temptation to legislate in their own favour (1987: 125). Even if enlightened lawmak-
ers were able to set aside their own interests and perspectives, he adds, the indirect 
15 Miller 2008: 138; Machiavelli 1970: 153–164.
16 The unequal division of property is said to be the “most common and durable source of 
factions”.
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effects and remote consequences of their decisions would be so complicated and 
difficult to foresee that almost any proposed law would be seen as conflicting with 
the interests of one section of the community.17 Since the tendency for citizens to 
see things from their own perspectives is so strong, then the solution according to 
Madison can only be this: “to refine and enlarge the public views” (1987: 126). It 
would, he argued, be possible to create a broader and more inclusive perspective 
of what is in the common interest which commands the loyalties of these various 
groups. The purpose of this enlargement and refinement is twofold: to bring local 
and sectional interests into the wider public view; and, at the same time, to instil 
a desire within parochial groups to consider the public good ahead of their own 
(1987: 126–7).
Both sides to the process of enlarging of people’s views are necessary. This 
means, first, that minority interests must be both expressible and able to be heard 
by the wider community. I have argued that the standard republican commitment to 
public debate based on the principles of public reason and collectively admissible 
considerations fails on this count since it is unable to incorporate the interests of 
those social groups whose interests are not easily expressed in its terms. How-
ever, sectarian groups – religious and non-religious alike – must, for their part, 
take responsibility for restricting their demands to those that fall within the idea of 
the common interests of the political community. Encouraging and enabling each 
group to exercise such a restraint, of course, is not easy but where the first condition 
of ensuring that everybody’s interests are heard in public discussion has been met, 
then the chances of achieving this second condition will be greatly enhanced.
The question then remains, how are republicans to ensure that the voices of each 
group within society are heard? Rather than enforcing a common standard of what 
is to count as an admissible consideration for debate, the argument here is that on 
all sides of a dispute, the citizens should come to adjust their outlooks so that they 
no longer regard their opponents as not having any legitimate claim to be taken 
seriously in public debate. In the context with which we are concerned, what is 
required is this. Religious groups must enlarge their perspectives to accommodate 
certain ideas which accompany the idea of living in a pluralistic society, such as the 
diversity of opinions other than their own and the separation of secular from sacred 
society. In part, this will entail an acceptance of the priority that public reason and 
collectively admissible considerations have in political discourse over exclusive 
religious arguments. In the same way, however, the perspectives of secular citizens 
must be similarly enlarged so that they come to see religious practice as a valid 
form of life in this same pluralistic political landscape rather than regarding them 
17 Richard Bellamy makes a similar point regarding the difficulties of attempting to legislate in this 
way in pluralist societies (2008: 169–70). 
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as, for example, relics of a bygone age with no inherent claim to a place in modern 
society.18 The religious views on homosexuality and women’s dress that we have 
discussed, then, may be thought flawed by non-religious citizens but they should 
not be dismissed as illegitimate candidates for discussion.
Exactly how this public enlargement of perspective is to be brought about, how-
ever, is a matter on which republicans have never been very precise. Madison had 
in mind deliberation by elected representatives from each group, chosen for their 
wisdom, patriotism and commitment to justice.19 It would be wonderful if such 
representatives could reliably be found. In their absence, more promising contem-
porary republican solutions might include the enabling of wider forms of public 
conversation based on the operation of a lively civil society, access to the media 
for marginalised groups, localised forums for debate and direct contact between 
citizens from the various sections of society who might otherwise have very lit-
tle social contact.20 Whatever the means, however, if republicans are to ease the 
tensions between religiously and ethically divided citizens whilst retaining their 
commitment to public debate as the means of upholding freedom and avoiding 
domination, then the outcome must be the preparedness of the citizens to enlarge 
their own outlooks about the range of ideas that are admissible within the delibera-
tive process itself.
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